

PRESS ADVISORY

No. 036-P
February 17, 1994

There will be a briefing on the Readiness Task Force interim report, Friday, February 18, 1994, by Secretary of Defense William Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili and General Edward Meyer (U.S. Army, Retired). The briefing will be at 1:30 p.m. in the Pentagon Press Briefing Room, 2E781.

-END-

**NEWS CONFERENCE TO RELEASE THE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT OF
THE
READINESS TASK FORCE**

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY

- We are here today to receive a progress report on an important part of our plan to meet the President's and my first priority for the Department -- keeping our forces ready to fight.
- The Chairman and I would like to welcome General Shy Meyer and thank him for joining us today. In a moment, he'll brief you on the work to date of the Readiness Task Force, which he chairs. Before hearing from General Meyer, I'd like to offer a few comments, and then ask the Chairman to add his perspective as well.
- General Meyer's briefing will cover several interim recommendations. These recommendations are very important to the Department. They'll help us ensure that we can keep our forces ready as we go through the turbulence of the defense drawdown.
- I support these recommendations. I'll be working with the Chairman, the Chiefs and others to see that they are carried out. Indeed, we've already started to do so.
- For example, the Task Force recommends that we improve the analytical tools we have to better understand how much readiness we'll get for the money we invest in it. Anticipating this recommendation, the Department had an offsite meeting in early January that put together a game plan carry out this recommendation. [You may wish to add other examples of the RTF's recommendations that we are carrying out -- e.g., more extensive use of distributed simulations for joint training, or conducting 2-MRC wargames to uncover readiness problems that may need correction.]
- In addition to the recommendations Shy will present, I want you to know that the work of his Task Force has already been most helpful to the Department. Let me mention four areas where it has contributed.
 1. It helped shape the defense budget I presented to you last week. It proposed setting readiness as first priority in funding allocations, and to giving special attention to the views of the combat commanders -- the CINCs -- in these allocations. Many of the features of the FY 1995 Defense Budget I told you about last week had their inspiration from this Task Force. Take, for example, the Budget's 5.6% increase in O&M funding as contrasted with a 7% decrease in force structure. This was a manifestation of their suggestion on priorities.
 2. It served as a catalyst that got the many diverse organizations with responsibilities for readiness talking to one another.

284

3. It gave new visibility and purpose to applying simulation technologies to help train our forces. These technologies will let our warfighters practice their skills with the help of computers. With these technologies, there is a good opportunity to make our forces even more ready than they are today -- especially for multi-service joint operations.
 4. It pointed out important areas where the Department needs to do some work. One area is improving joint readiness -- being ready to carry out operations involving several services. The Chairman may have some comments on this in a moment.
- Despite these accomplishments, the work of the Readiness Task Force isn't complete. In addition to its recommendations, the RTF's report has included a tentative list of areas where we might have readiness problems down stream. I've asked the Task Force to follow up on these -- to determine which future readiness problems require preventative actions today and to propose what those actions might be. I anticipate their final report on this at the end of May.
 - Let me now ask the Chairman to provide his perspective on the Task Force's interim report.

Os & As -- MEYER PANEL PROGRESS REPORT PRESS CONFERENCE

Question: Is readiness being maintained today or is it slipping? How far are we from a return to the hollow force situation of the late '70s?

Answer: The readiness of our forces remains acceptable overall. There are some cases where, for example, units do not have a full complement of personnel that are trained up to the standards we'd like. But cases like this are a result of the turbulence of rapidly downsizing our forces. When they crop up, the Services are responsible for quick corrections. We expect this to subside as we adjust to the new Defense environment.

Question: How far are we from a return to the hollow force situation of the late '70s?

Answer: We're a long way from a hollow force. We intend to keep that distance. Take, for example the quality of our recruits. In 1980, 68% had high school diplomas and 28% were "high quality" -- scored in the upper half of the enlistment tests. At the end of 1993, the numbers were 95% high school grads and 66% high quality.

Question: The report mentions that shortages in spare parts are appearing throughout the Air Force, and maintenance backlogs are popping up everywhere. How serious are these areas and what corrections are required?

Answer: There's turbulence in spare parts and depot maintenance created by decommissioning ships, retiring aircraft, transferring systems to the Reserve Component, and pulling back from overseas bases. We first try to anticipate the effects of this turbulence and take preventive measures before problems arise. But with the uncertainties of the drawdown, we sometimes don't anticipate the exact level of supplies we'll need to meet our readiness demand. Sometimes the overall supplies are okay, but they're not in the right place. It's unrealistic to think we won't have this turbulence. The key -- and the approach we're pursuing -- is to identify problems to correct them quickly. The Chiefs and CINCs are carrying out their responsibilities to do this.

Question: Do you believe that the two-MRC strategy of the Bottom-Up Review is doable? Do you agree with what Congressman Murtha (D-PA) said recently about not being able to do two nearly simultaneous MRCs?

Answer: I should first point out that it was not the job of the Readiness Task Force to evaluate the adequacy of forces to carry out the Bottom-Up Review. Based, however, on the analysis of the Bottom-Up Review -- analysis conducted in collaboration with the Chairman and other military leaders -- I believe the force structure overall is adequate. There are some parts of our force where we are doing more analysis to discover if there

are shortfalls. For example, C4I is one brought to my attention by the Meyer Panel. If we find a problem, we'll certainly move to correct it.

Question: What are now the key readiness indicators which, if they "break" in the future, would suggest that the military is no longer able to meet the requirements of our national strategy? What kinds of systems will the Department of Defense and Services have to put into place which allow them to predict future levels of readiness? How long will that take?

Answer: As the Readiness Task Force points out, we have a very well developed means used by the Services to measure the readiness of our units. This system is known as SORTS -- Status of Readiness and Training System. It measures the skilled people, operating equipment, and spare parts as a percent of what a unit needs to accomplish its mission. The Task Force, however, also points out that we don't have in place an effective system that predicts the future readiness of these units. Nor do we have a system that measures very well joint readiness -- readiness of combinations of units from several Services to fight together. Thus a major thrust of the Chairman's and my program to follow up on these recommendations is to develop these readiness measurement systems.

Question: You suggest the need for a JCS wargame to test our ability to execute the two MRC strategy? Are you suggesting that the BUR was not sufficiently tested before we signed up to it or is this a continuing requirement?

Answer: The BUR, I believe, got the basics right. Its estimates for gross size and mix of forces are sound. But we must ensure that there are no devils in the details that could undermine our strategy. Thus, the purpose of the wargame is to discover if there are any of these devils. If we find them, we'll take care of them.

Question: The RTF report suggests problems where we are operating our forces so often that it may be burning out people -- an OPTEMPO -- PERSTEMPO mismatch. Are our forces already stretched too thin? With more force cuts projected in the future, how close are we to breaking the force?

Answer: Our forces are not as yet stretched too thin, but we're clearly stressing our people more than we did in much of the Cold War. In the short term, we'll be making continuing adjustments to make sure we're fair to our people. In the long term -- after we've had more experience in this post-Cold War environment -- we may have to re-examine how we operate our forces in peacetime.

Question: In the recent President's budget, \$300 million was budgeted for "peace enforcement" operations in FY 95, with \$150 million for the outyears. Given your comments about the cost to readiness of "out of hide" operations, this doesn't seem to be enough money to address the problem. Everyone predicts that the Bosnias, Somalias and Haitis are going to become more frequent in the future. What is needed to protect training dollars and O&M from being lost to contingency operations?

Answer: This is an issue that's come up frequently, including from the Readiness Task Force. We must find a solution -- one that gives flexibility in flowing funds to keep our forces ready, and one that respects the perspectives of the Hill. I hope in the coming months to work closely with Congress to come up with an approach that resolves this problem.

Question: The report argues that there is not a budgetary responsiveness to the CINC/JCS' "Preparedness Evaluation System." That suggests a situation where, notwithstanding paying lip service to protecting readiness, future defense budgets are determined by political factors or arbitrary budget figures and not by threat-based and readiness requirements. Do you agree that is where we are now or where we are going?

Answer: No. The basic determinant of our forces and budgets is our strategy to deal with the security threats we foresee -- the strategy developed in the BUR. The "Preparedness Evaluation System" referred to is one of the instruments the CINCs use to give their views on the risks associated with carrying out their part of the strategy. The Task Force and I find this instrument needs to be adjusted. It does not now reliably give me budget-related advice when I need it and in a form I can act on. The Chairman is working up a proposal to make the PES more responsive to our resource allocation needs.

Question: You say in the report that joint/combined training is inadequate. This suggests that the Services talk joint, but don't necessarily sufficiently plan for it, that there's still too much Service parochialism in training and equipping forces, and that the CINCs are not sufficiently involved. Is that true and what can be done about it?

Answer: Our forces have always operated as a team, and efforts to improve this teamwork are continuously ongoing. In fact, the Task Force noted numerous Department initiatives to enhance joint training. The problem the Task Force points to has its origins in the mechanisms we use to plan for and carry out joint training. Responsibilities among the Chairman, the CINCs and the Services need some more clarity. I anticipate that these parties, under the leadership of the Chairman, will offer a proposal on how we should make improvements.

Question: At various times, the Army seems to treat its reserve components as a greater threat than foreign governments or forces. Is it reasonable to think that the Army will show greater faith in providing realistic training opportunities and modernized equipment to the reserves when there appears to be such competition between them?

Answer: I believe we are entering a new era in the relationships between the active and reserve components of the Army. Let me cite two examples. First, the BUR, with the concurrence of senior active military leaders, specified a need for 15 enhanced readiness brigades from the Army Guard. This signified acceptance of the legitimacy of the Army Guard in combat roles to cover an important part of our strategy. Second was the announcement by Secretary Aspin last Fall on personnel levels for the Army Guard and Reserve. These were publicly endorsed by active and reserve leaders from all significant public and private organizations. It was unprecedented. Thus I believe we'll see great active-reserve cooperation in the future.

Question: The RTF's Progress Report indicates the need for the Department to make fundamental adjustments in the way it oversees and manages readiness. Does this mean that you intend to change the Services' Title X responsibilities? What should be the roles of OSD and of the Chairman in a new readiness strategy?

Answer: The Department, in part based on suggestions of the Task Force, will make many changes to keep our forces ready. Perhaps the most striking suggestion from the RTF involves our readiness for joint military operations with units participating from several services. As in the Gulf War, we have forces now that can conduct joint operations very well. But in the case of the Gulf War, we had to iron out some bugs that we may not have time to do in the next war. To ensure we don't have joint readiness problems, we need clarity in responsibilities among the Chairman, the CINCs and the Services. I anticipate that these parties, under the leadership of the Chairman, will offer useful proposals on how we should make improvements.

Question: Former Secretary Aspin and General Meyer stated in May that the RTF would be involved in ongoing readiness appraisals, issuing periodic reports beyond May 1994. Is this what you plan?

Answer: I'd certainly want to be able to call on the members of the RTF for advice for as long as I'm in office. Whether it would be a worthwhile use of their valuable time for added intense analytical efforts beyond May depends in part on what added work, if any, needs to be done. In any event, any future work will be carried out only after close consultations among the Panel members, the Chairman, and other senior leaders including myself.

Question: Have you assessed the future readiness impact of cutting procurement funds in favor of O&M, and R&D?

Answer: Key to readiness is balance -- balance in the investments we make to ensure readiness today, largely in O&M accounts, with investments for readiness in the future, including R&D and procurement. Our judgment was to protect near term readiness by increasing O&M funding in the FY 1995 budget by 5.6%, balanced with protecting long term readiness by a \$1.4 billion increase in RTD&E funding. At the same time, we believed we could safely cut procurement for now. The combination of drawing down to a smaller force structure and the investments in equipment during the later part of the Cold War allow us to take these procurement funding reductions and still keep a balanced investment program for readiness.

Question: How can the Meyer Panel say in one part of its report that the readiness of our forces is acceptable, and elsewhere say DoD doesn't have the wherewithal to measure readiness? Which side of this do you come down on?

Answer: Based on the information I have available, my judgment is that the readiness of our forces today is acceptable. I believe that's a judgment the Chairman, the Meyer Panel and others would share. What the Meyer Panel is saying on measuring readiness is that the Department should get more and better information to sharpen these judgments. This is particularly true when it comes to measuring what future readiness we can expect for our forces for a given allocation of funds.

Question: The report says that its "recommendations should serve as a basis for fundamental adjustments in the way the Department of Defense oversees and manages the readiness of its military forces." What fundamental changes will occur? Will there be big shifts in the roles of the Chiefs, the Chairman, the CINCs?

Answer: The recommendations will not trigger any sweeping organizational changes. They will likely change how some key organizations do business. In the past, much of the focus has been on readiness of our units -- readiness that's primarily the responsibility of the Services. The recommendations of the RTF bring in sharp focus an added dimension of readiness -- joint readiness, or the ability of many units of different Services to work in concert to perform missions. Following through on these recommendations will mean the Services will continue their role in keeping units ready. But it also will mean much more attention to the roles of the Chairman and the CINCs in their management of joint readiness.



ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY

290
K177
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010



FEB 17 1994
SECDEF HAS SEEN
FEB 22 1994
m 2/17

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Interim Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness

This memorandum forwards the interim report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness. I recommend release of this report for widest dissemination. I have signed the attached memorandum to that effect subject to your final approval.

John M. Deutch

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DECISION

 h APPROVED
 DISAPPROVED
 OTHER

1720894

03705





ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY

291
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010



FEB 17 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Interim Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness

This memorandum provides the interim report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness for your review.


The Task Force was chartered to provide advice, recommendations, and supporting rationale which address (1) key indicators for measuring readiness and candidate methodologies for providing early warning of potential readiness problems and (2) other matters affecting individual and collective readiness. The Task Force reviewed a broad range of readiness topics and looked in depth at numerous specific aspects of readiness, particularly the readiness management and oversight process. In conducting its activities, the Task Force met as a group frequently, and its members visited numerous sites to gather information for the interim report. Significantly, the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense met with the Task Force at many of its meetings. Additionally, the Task Force met with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs as it developed interim observations and recommendations. As a result of these collaborative efforts, steps to implement many of the recommendations of this interim report already are underway.

Recommendations in the interim report include the need to:

- o Bring a greater joint forces perspective to readiness.
- o Improve analytical tools to help project the future readiness implications of our policy and budgetary decisions;
- o Reexamine the readiness oversight and management roles of OSD, JCS, the Services, and the CINCs; and
- o Work with Congress in developing a contingency funding system which does not harm readiness.

If you have any comments or suggestions on this interim report, please provide them to the Executive Director of the Defense Science Board by March 15, 1994. He will consolidate replies, including negative replies, for my review and for consideration by the Task Force in developing its final report.

I am approving the release of this interim report to the ATSD (Public Affairs) for appropriate dissemination.


John M. Deutch

Attachment



Distribution:

Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretary of Defense Policy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Personnel and Readiness
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security)
Assistant To Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)
Comptroller
General Counsel
Inspector General
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production & Logistics)
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Technology)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security)
Director, Acquisition Program Integration
Director, Defense Procurement
Director, Defense Research & Engineering
Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation
Director, Strategic & Space Systems
Director, Tactical Systems
Director, Test & Evaluation
Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, Defense Nuclear Agency
Director, Model Improvement & Study Management Agency
Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
Commandant, Defense Acquisition Management College

REPORT OF THE
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
TASK FORCE
ON
READINESS
(INTERIM REPORT)

FEBRUARY 1994



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3140

THIS REPORT IS A PRODUCT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD (DSB). THE DSB IS A FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE INDEPENDENT ADVICE TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. STATEMENTS, OPINIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS REPORT DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

This document is UNCLASSIFIED.

Security review completed 14 February, 1994

by

OASD (Public Affairs),

Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review,

Case number 94-S-0558



DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

295

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3140

February 15, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION &
TECHNOLOGY)

SUBJECT: Interim Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Readiness

This memorandum provides for your review and comment the interim report of the DSB Task Force on Readiness, and recommends that you forward the report to the Secretary of Defense. The report focuses on the Department's readiness management and oversight processes, especially key indicators for measuring readiness and candidate methodologies for providing early warning of potential readiness problems, and on other matters affecting individual and collective readiness, such as structure, lift, and sustainability.

In conducting its activities, the Readiness Task Force has met as a group frequently, and its members have visited numerous sites to gather information for the interim report. They also met with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services Chiefs. The Task Force did not look in detail into acquisition, technology, or industrial base issues related to readiness; the adequacy of forces to carry out the Bottom-Up Review; or nuclear forces strategy and requirements. Regarding the current status of military readiness, the Task Force concluded that although there are some downward indicators, the general readiness posture of our military forces is acceptable.

For analytical purposes, the Task Force divided readiness into three levels: unit, joint (and combined) force, and national. The Task Force found that there currently exists a well-defined reporting system to evaluate the current readiness of combat and support units. On the other hand, it found the Department's systems for predicting future unit readiness significantly less mature and less comprehensive.

The Task Force assessed the current state of the Department's ability to measure joint readiness as poorly defined. Specifically, there is neither a clear definition of joint readiness nor of a system to measure it.

At the highest level, national readiness is important to ensure that our forces have sufficient readiness to carry out our National Military Strategy. The analysis conducted under the Bottom-Up Review provided the basis for addressing the strategic readiness of our forces in some areas, notably in force structure. This analysis, however, did not consider all essential elements in strategic readiness. For example, it did not analyze in sufficient depth the C4I needed to integrate forces. Additional analysis is being conducted by OSD, the Chairman, and the CINCs. The Task Force deferred judgment on this level of readiness.

Recommendations in the interim report include the need to: bring a greater joint forces perspective to readiness; improve analytical tools to help project the future readiness implications of our policy and budgetary decisions; reexamine the readiness oversight and management roles of OSD, JCS, the Services, and the CINCs; and work with Congress in developing a contingency funding system which does not harm readiness.

Taken in the aggregate, the interim report's recommendations could serve to support the broad policy adjustments the Department of Defense is taking in overseeing and managing readiness. I concur with the observations and recommendations of the Task Force, and recommend that you forward the report to the Secretary of Defense.

Paul A. Kaminski

Paul G. Kaminski
Chairman



DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

297

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3140

14 February 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Readiness


Attached is the interim report of the DSB study on readiness. The Terms of Reference asked us to provide advice, recommendations, and supporting rationale which address the areas below.

- Key indicators for measuring readiness and candidate methodologies for providing early warning of potential readiness problems, including assessments of:
 - How the Department deals with readiness concerns; and
 - The adequacy of existing readiness reporting systems.
- Other matters affecting individual and collective readiness, such as: structure, lift, sustainability, active-reserve mix, retention, training, and the use of civilians and coalition personnel support.

The readiness Task Force has reviewed a broad range of readiness topics and has looked in depth at numerous specific aspects of readiness, particularly the readiness management and oversight process. In conducting its activities, the Readiness Task Force has met as a group frequently, and its members have visited numerous sites to gather information for the interim report. Significantly, the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense have met with us at many of our group meetings so that they could take timely action, rather than wait for the results of our reports. In addition, we have met with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs as we developed our findings and recommendations. As a result of these collaborative efforts, steps to implement many of the recommendations made in this report already are underway.

The interim report includes six observations and ten recommendations, with the recommendations split into the following categories: joint force readiness, projecting future readiness, organizing for readiness, and funding contingency operations. The interim report also proposes a list of activities necessary to prepare a final report.

The Readiness Task Force anticipates providing a final report to the Secretary of Defense by May 21, 1994.


General Edward C. Meyer (U.S. Army, Retired)
Chairman

Attachment

**DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON READINESS
INTERIM REPORT**

Chairman

**General Edward C. Meyer
(U.S. Army, Retired)**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	3
II.	OVERVIEW	3
III.	SCOPE -- READY TO DO WHAT?	5
IV.	CURRENT FACTORS AFFECTING READINESS	6
V.	LEVELS OF READINESS	7
	A. ELEMENTS OF A READINESS SYSTEM	8
	B. CURRENT UNIT READINESS	8
	C. FUTURE UNIT READINESS	9
	D. JOINT (AND COMBINED) FORCES READINESS (CURRENT & FUTURE)	9
	E. READINESS TO SUPPORT THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY	10
VI.	OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE WORK	11

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON READINESS**INTERIM REPORT****I. INTRODUCTION**

The Secretary of Defense established the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Readiness, known as the "Readiness Task Force" (RTF), to provide him with advice, recommendations, and supporting rationale which address the areas below.¹

- Key indicators for measuring readiness and candidate methodologies for providing early warning of potential readiness problems, including assessments of:
 - How the Department deals with readiness concerns; and
 - The adequacy of existing readiness reporting systems.
- Other matters affecting individual and collective readiness, such as: structure, lift, sustainability, active-reserve mix, retention, training, and the use of civilians and coalition personnel support.

Members of the Readiness Task Force are:

General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Retired), Chairman
General Maxwell R. Thurman, USA (Retired)
General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Retired)
Admiral Huntington Hardisty, USN (Retired)
Admiral Robert L. Long, USN (Retired)
General Joseph J. Went, USMC (Retired)
Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr., USA (Retired)
Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., ARNG (Retired)

II. OVERVIEW

The Readiness Task Force has reviewed a broad range of readiness topics and has looked in depth at numerous specific aspects of readiness. This Interim Report of the Readiness Task Force highlights areas that we believe the Department of Defense should focus on to provide the ready forces needed, today and tomorrow, to respond to likely challenges in the changing world environment. The report also provides recommendations for the next phase of the Task Force's activities, and proposes a May deadline for our final report.

¹The Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness was established on May 19, 1993 in Terms of Reference signed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.

In conducting its activities, the Readiness Task Force has met as a group frequently, and its members have visited numerous sites, individually as well as in groups, to gather information for this report. Significantly, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have met with us at most of our group meetings so that they could take timely action, rather than wait for formal reports. In addition, we have met with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs as we developed our findings and recommendations. As a result of these collaborative efforts, steps to implement many of the recommendations made in this report already are underway.

To help understand the findings and recommendations in this Interim Report, the points below establish the context in which they should be read.

- **Current Status of Military Readiness.** Although there are some downward indicators, we found the general readiness posture of our military forces to be acceptable. Many of our current readiness concerns are a direct result of turbulence associated with the drawdown in our force structure, complications associated with changes in strategy, and changes in resource allocations stemming from budget reductions. We would expect such turbulence to subside as we adjust to the new defense environment. Civilian and military leaders are concerned, however, that, unless we take preventive or corrective actions, continuing force reductions, strategy changes, and budget reductions could cause serious readiness degradations. We think these are legitimate concerns.
- **Current Readiness Reporting Systems.** Current readiness assessment systems, while having shortcomings which this report addresses, were designed to focus on specific readiness resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, training, supplies) that are critical to achieving unit readiness. Other systems provide general information which permits identifying major shortfalls in resources that would inhibit responses to contingencies. This information, coupled with our commanders' experienced judgments, has provided a useful assessment of current unit readiness.
- **Readiness Task Force Focus.** Taken in the aggregate, our initial recommendations should serve as a basis for adjustments in the way the Department of Defense oversees and manages the readiness of its military forces. While the military Services should continue to exercise the readiness responsibilities they have today, they should take steps that will help the Department to:
 1. Bring a greater joint forces perspective to readiness, in addition to the largely single-service unit perspective we have today;
 2. Develop ways to project the future readiness implications of our policy and budgetary decisions, rather than waiting until such decisions have been implemented in order to determine whether the readiness of our forces has been degraded;
 3. Develop better ways to link readiness concerns to our policy development and resource allocation processes; and

4. Integrate the readiness oversight and management roles of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs and the Services.

This Interim Report addresses our concerns in each of these areas and suggests approaches for dealing with them.

III. SCOPE -- READY TO DO WHAT?

The Readiness Task Force focused on the readiness management and oversight process. We did not look in detail into: acquisition, technology, or industrial base issues related to readiness (which are being examined by separate Task Forces of the Defense Science Board); the adequacy of forces to carry out the Bottom-Up Review; or the readiness of the nuclear forces to carry out the nuclear forces strategy pending the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review.

A major challenge has been to answer the question -- "Ready to do what?" This question was partially answered in September with the release of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), which addressed the needs for conventional and unconventional forces. Our Task Force has determined that the conventional and unconventional forces should be ready to respond to the three areas defined in the Bottom-Up Review:

- Rapid response to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts anywhere in the world with major land, sea, air, and space forces.
- Rapid response to small contingencies, sometimes requiring highly precise operations, with a very high probability of success from the outset of the operation.
- Special capabilities demanded by special situations in peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian missions, etc.

The Services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in a continuing process of evaluating the adequacy of the forces necessary to carry out the requirements identified through the Bottom-Up Review. Moreover, in light of the importance of joint and combined operations in the protection of U.S. and allied security interests, the FY 1995-99 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) directed the CINCs to assess joint readiness in the context of the Bottom-Up Review and to advise on readiness matters in the Program and Budget process.

IV. CURRENT FACTORS AFFECTING READINESS

The Readiness Task Force's review took into account the impacts on readiness of the following changes:

- The world situation and threat perception;
- National military strategy;
- Funding levels;
- Roles and missions;
- End strengths - military, active, reserve, civilian;
- Organization of force structure;
- Production, availability and access to strategic resources;
- Personnel quality of life and morale;
- Basing (overseas and CONUS); and
- Supporting infrastructure.

Many of these changes have a negative impact on near-term readiness, and affect each of the Services differently. Examples are:

- Army -- Increasing the practice of borrowing military manpower to conduct tasks unrelated to their military missions, and increasing numbers of mismatches between job requirements and service-member skills ("MOS mismatches") due to personnel turbulence;
- Navy -- Providing operating funds for bases that did not close as scheduled, even though O&M funds for those bases were removed from the budget;
- Air Force -- Shortfall in availability of critical spare parts due to turbulence associated with the rapid drawdown.
- Marine Corps: Lengthy or frequent contingency deployments ("high OPTEMPO") that prevent units from participating in required training activities.

Until this change-related turbulence declines, units in the field will inevitably be subject to some degraded readiness. Turbulence is the number-one enemy of cohesiveness in units and concomitant readiness. During this period of change, there will be various instances of degraded readiness occurring, and anecdotal evidence of readiness problems from the field will be common.

There are several changes which should have a positive impact on readiness. In addition to the creation of our Task Force, the Department has undertaken additional initiatives to ensure the continuing readiness of U.S. military forces, consistent with our national security requirements:

- Made readiness the Department of Defense's top priority and included readiness reporting requirements in the Defense Planning Guidance;
- Created the Senior Readiness Oversight Council. This council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is the senior-level DoD forum for readiness policy and oversight.
- Created the Readiness Working Group. This group provides the primary support for the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.
- Established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel was reorganized and renamed, and then elevated to Under-Secretary status.
- Established the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness. This new position in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is the focal point on the OSD staff for readiness issues.
- Increased Service focus on unit readiness monitoring capabilities; and
- Conducted readiness off-site meetings (three-days of meetings chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense), which resulted in plans to develop analytical tools that relate resources to readiness.

Additionally, Congress has demonstrated continuing support for readiness in the budget process.

V. LEVELS OF READINESS

Based on U.S. security requirements posed by the Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), small contingencies, and special capabilities noted in Section III above, the Readiness Task Force, drawing on JCS definitions, discussions with senior civilian and military defense leaders, and our members' own experiences, found it useful to consider the three readiness levels defined below:

1. **Unit readiness** -- the level of preparedness of units to execute assigned missions with available weapon systems or support systems. The Task Force specifically addressed both current unit readiness and indicators of future unit readiness.
2. **Joint (and combined) force readiness** -- the level of preparedness of Combatant Commands and Joint Task Forces to integrate ready combat and support units into an effective joint and combined operating force.

3. National readiness -- the level of preparedness to support the national military strategy is the broadest level of readiness, which includes the traditional four pillars of military capability: readiness of military units (and joint and combined forces readiness), sustainability in combat, modernization of forces, and force structure.

A. Elements of a Readiness System

The Task Force determined that managing and assessing the first ("unit") and second ("joint force") levels of readiness requires a system that contains at least the following five elements:

- Defined areas of readiness (e.g., equipment, personnel, training, C4I, etc.);
- Clearly assigned responsibility and criteria for those areas of readiness;
- Measures of readiness in each of the defined areas;
- A reporting and verification system; and
- A system of review by the various levels of authority responsible for allocating resources to achieve readiness and/or decisions to employ ready forces.

Our Task Force assessed existing readiness systems as defined by the above five elements. Further, we made some preliminary judgments about how well the current readiness system works. In this Interim Report we have made some specific comments on the state of readiness as defined, reported, and reviewed by the existing system. We will make additional comments and recommendations in our final report.

B. Current Unit Readiness

There currently exists a well-defined reporting system to evaluate the current readiness of combat and support units. It embraces the five elements of a readiness system as defined above. For example, the elements of unit readiness include equipment readiness, personnel readiness, and training readiness. Responsibility for each of these areas is clearly defined within the military Services' statutory responsibility to organize, train, and equip forces. The Services have mature measurement and reporting systems for units, and results are evaluated and validated through readiness inspections, exercises, and contingency after-action reviews. Unit readiness reporting is reviewed at multiple levels, including the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While shortfalls exist in current readiness, generally stemming from having to make choices among limited resources, the current unit readiness system is mature and well understood at multiple levels of command, management, assessment and review.

C. Future Unit Readiness

The Department's systems for predicting future unit readiness are significantly less mature and less comprehensive than those for reporting current unit readiness. For example, current reporting systems include the unit commander's forecasts of near-term changes in each of the readiness measurement areas. Commanders often base these forecasts on short-term and anecdotal considerations with little benefit of analyses of quantified data. While there are some mature, validated systems in use within the Services for assessing the impact of current budget allocations on future readiness, there is no comprehensive, aggregated system of assessment, reporting, and reviews useful to senior OSD, JCS and CINC decision makers.

Early in our effort, we attempted to identify key indicators that could serve as useful "red flags" for senior defense managers to signal potential problems affecting future readiness. While such warnings could be identified in each readiness measurement area, some problems may not be evident until it is too late to take preventive actions. Therefore, we believe it is more useful to the decision maker to have valid longer-range predictions of impacts expressed in terms similar to those used to assess current readiness. Initial successes in this area give us high confidence this can be done.

For example, the Air Force uses a mature, calibrated system that forecasts future equipment readiness in terms similar to those used to describe current equipment readiness -- weapons system mission-capable rates and sortie-generation capability. This Air Force system to forecast equipment readiness uses input variables such as: dollars available to buy spare parts, depot and unit logistics, manpower, systems reliability, and maintenance practices. The outputs are mission-capable rates and sortie-generation capability by system. While this system does not predict readiness by unit, predicting readiness by weapons system is useful for both budget allocation and future force readiness purposes.

Other systems, which exist or are being developed, such as the Army's system to forecast personnel levels, offer likely candidates for upgrade to achieve the level of comprehensiveness needed to give useful predictions of future readiness in the other measurement areas. However, there is, at present, no requirement for reporting and review of this projected data at OSD, JCS, or CINC levels.

D. Joint (and Combined) Forces Readiness

Our Task Force assessed the current state of the Department's ability to measure joint readiness as poorly defined. Specifically, there is no clear definition of areas of joint readiness (analogous to the elements of unit readiness) that incorporates the following (as well as other) essential elements:

- Unit readiness;
- The C4I system;

- Deployability of forces;
- Theater or JTF logistics support;
- En route and theater infrastructure support;
- Joint and combined training and exercises;
- Theater-allied relationships; and
- Nuclear command and control.

For "unit" readiness, the elements of readiness, responsibility, measures, reporting and reviews are well defined. Responsibility for all elements of readiness is assigned to a single organization (a military department). In contrast, such a clear assignment seems impractical for joint force readiness. Instead, it is likely to be more useful to define separate responsibility, measures, reporting, and review for each element of joint forces readiness.

For example, there is general agreement that CINCs who are Commanders of Combatant Commands are largely responsible for the elements of joint forces readiness. There is a requirement that these Commanders report periodically to the Chairman, JCS on a range of subjects that pertain to joint forces readiness. However, there is no defined, comprehensive approach to assigning responsibilities and matching control of resources to these responsibilities. Further, for most elements of joint forces readiness, the measures are not specific nor are there requirements to validate the measurements through assessments comparable to unit readiness inspections. There are general requirements for Combatant Commanders to report on a wide range of readiness issues to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense, and for the Chairman to provide a separate readiness assessment to the Secretary of Defense. The current system, however, is not well designed to assess current joint force readiness.

We also reviewed the ability to evaluate joint readiness over time. The Service systems are in the nascent stage of developing predictive means for measuring future readiness, and that predictive capability is limited predominantly to the weapons systems area. Translating these means into useful methods for predictive joint readiness will require an all out effort by the entire defense establishment.

E. Readiness to Support the National Military Strategy

In order to determine how capable our joint forces are to carry out specific contingencies, simulated war games must be conducted which stress the entire range of military capabilities - (combat, mobility, support, space, etc.). CINCs have run exercises of this nature in the past; however, the adequacy and readiness of the support systems has not been exercised for some time.

When there is general agreement on standards for joint readiness, it will be essential to conduct several simulation assisted war games to aid in determining the adequacy of the resources to carry out the strategy.

VI. INTERIM OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This section summarizes the main thrust of our work to date and our plans to carry it to completion.

A. Observations

Based on the many briefings, extensive consultations with senior military and civilians, and internal deliberations, the Readiness Task Force offers the following observations concerning readiness:

- **Recognizing the Challenge.** The Defense Department has recognized the potential threats to readiness. It has taken early steps to address these threats, including:
 - Setting readiness as the first priority for the Department.
 - Issuing guidance to the Services to construct their programs and budgets so that readiness will be funded at a level sufficient to carry out the tasks prescribed in the Bottom-Up Review.
 - Inviting the combatant commanders in the field -- the CINCs -- to express their readiness concerns to the Secretary at a specially convened Defense Resources Board meeting during the program and budget review process.
 - Creating the position of Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, supported by a Deputy Under Secretary for Readiness, to serve as the focal point for DoD readiness activities.
 - Conducting a defense issues conference that included a major addressal of the relationship of resources to readiness.
- **Defining Readiness to Do What.** A prerequisite for ensuring that forces are ready, is to have a definition of what missions the forces need to be ready to perform. The Bottom-Up Review provided the framework for this definition. It defined the overall classes of military operations in which U.S. forces should be prepared to engage, and in the case of major regional conflicts, rough timing for the engagement of major combat units. Still to be fully defined, however, are the readiness requirements for many other essential parts of the force, including support units, elements such as C4I and strategic lift needed to integrate units to make them effective in joint operations, and a variety of supporting infrastructure. Further, such definition has yet to take place for operations below the scale of major regional conflicts (e.g., peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, disaster relief) or for operations involving weapons of mass destruction.
- **Current Readiness Status.** The general readiness posture of our military units today appears to be acceptable. For several years to come, however, turbulence associated with the drawdown in force structure, changes in strategy, and budget reductions will likely result in many anecdotal reports of readiness problems. An individual unit, for example, may experience a temporary shortage in personnel during transition. In this case, what is

important for readiness overall is that such a temporary shortfall is of short duration and/or compensated for elsewhere in the force. The Department should take careful notice of anecdotal readiness problems which collectively may foretell broad trends toward hollowness within units that will require corrective actions.

- **Focusing on Joint Readiness.** The Department's focus for readiness assessments and resource allocation traditionally has been on military units within each of the services. Virtually every military operation envisioned in the Bottom-Up Review, however, will involve joint operations where units of several services need to operate in concert to accomplish overall objectives. Thus a force whose units are ready may not necessarily be a force ready for such joint operations. This suggests broadening the focus beyond near exclusive attention to units within the Services to include the readiness of multi-service forces to engage successfully in military operations.
- **Reporting and Projecting Unit and Joint Readiness.** As indicated above, the Department has in place a very extensive system to report on the current readiness of military units within each of the Services. There does not exist, however, an effective system to project the future readiness of these units -- to estimate whether they will be ready to carry out tasks in the future, given funds allocated for readiness in DoD programs and budgets. As for readiness to conduct multi-service joint operations, there do not exist effective systems either to assess the current state of joint readiness, or to estimate future joint readiness resulting from a given funding allocation.
- **Carrying Out the National Military Strategy.** The Readiness Task Force did not assess directly whether our forces have sufficient readiness or capability to carry out our National Military Strategy. It does not appear that the analysis conducted during the Bottom-Up Review considered all the essential elements of strategic readiness. For example, it did not analyze in sufficient depth the needs for C4I to integrate forces, nor did it sufficiently account for readiness to deal with threats from weapons of mass destruction. Additional analysis in these and other areas is being conducted by OSD, the Chairman, and the CINCs. Therefore, judgments on the adequacy and readiness of forces to carry out the guidance in the Bottom-Up Review must be deferred until such efforts have matured.

B. Interim Recommendations

Given our observations, we recommend that the Department give consideration to pursuing the activities listed below.²

1. Joint Force Readiness. The Department should provide greater emphasis on the joint forces perspective of readiness. This could be realized through carrying out a number of activities, including those to:
 - Define in specific terms what criteria a force must meet in order to be judged ready to carry out joint operations.
 - Develop and implement a system to measure, assess and report on whether forces meet the criteria for being ready for joint operations.
 - Adjust the Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS) used to develop and review readiness funding streams, to ensure that the perspective of the CINCs -- the combatant commanders who are the customers for use of ready joint forces -- are effectively represented both in the construction and review of budget and program proposals developed by the services.³
 - Develop fully the Department's C4I architecture -- the integration of command control, communications, computer and intelligence assets needed to support joint military operations. This should include the readiness of satellite components (communication and intelligence) of the C4I system to ensure it can support joint contingency operations.
 - Improve coordination among the various military institutions involved in joint readiness, to include, for example, convening a future conference involving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the CINCs to consider creation of definitions, and reporting systems for joint force readiness.

² We recommend that the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness propose to the Secretary of Defense the responsibilities for the appropriate offices within OSD who in conjunction with the Services and the OJCS will ensure that the recommendations described here are implemented.

³ One example here is modification of the Preparedness Evaluation System, the vehicle for the CINCs to report on their readiness needs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and civilian leaders. Currently the system: 1) raises a very long list of issues of varied priority and linkage to readiness; 2) does not necessarily provide CINC perspectives at a time when they would be most effective in influencing Service programs and budgets; and 3) does not provide the CINCs the wherewithal to make recommendations and suggest tradeoffs in the context of constrained availability of funding. Modifications to this system could include encouraging CINCs to set priorities on their concerns with a focus on those most important to readiness, incorporating flexible reporting so CINC inputs will be timely, and improving information flow to the CINCs to allow them to make readiness recommendations in the context of budget constraints.

- Initiate planning for a major joint wargame to test the joint readiness of U.S. forces (with or without allied support) and all essential supporting elements to execute two nearly simultaneous MRCs with a particular view toward identifying major shortfalls in readiness that need correction. Such a wargame should take advantage of new technological developments that allow such games to be conducted using a combination of live field exercises linked with computer simulations that represent non-exercised portions of military operations.
 - Conduct nuclear exercises involving the joint military and civilian command structure to ensure the ability of military and civilian leadership to carry out their roles, and provide confidence in the continued effectiveness of nuclear control and security means. These steps need to be taken regardless of the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review.
2. Projecting Future Readiness. The Department should improve analytical tools to help project the future readiness implications of our policy and budgetary decisions. Activities in support of this recommendation would include:
- A Department work plan to develop and improve the set of analytical models and other means that can be used to help better understand the relationship between funding allocation decisions and future force readiness.
 - A pilot program at USACOM and USCENCOM which will provide each CINC with the capability to contribute timely and useful input to the Service requirements process.
3. Organizing For Readiness. The Department should reexamine the readiness oversight and management roles of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and the CINCs. In many areas of readiness, responsibilities are clear. The Title X responsibilities of the Services to organize, train and equip units is a notable example. In the case of resource allocations to support readiness, and planning for readiness to conduct joint operations, responsibilities are less clear. Such responsibilities should be delineated to ensure an effective overall program for readiness is carried out. In addition, where there are ongoing efforts within the Department concerning functional areas (e.g. Defense Science Board Task Force on Gulf War Health Effects, Nuclear Posture Review, Facilities (BRAC '95), etc.), readiness matters should be included in their terms of reference, and their outputs should include an assessment of the impact of the proposals on readiness.
4. Funding Contingency Operations. The Department should work with Congress in developing a contingency funding system which does not divert, delay or disrupt the flow of funds needed to maintain readiness of forces not engaged in these operations.

C. Future Work

Additional Research. The recommendations above are based on the work of the Readiness Task Force to date. This work is admittedly incomplete. There are several areas that require more in-depth investigation before we can offer further recommendations with confidence. These areas include:

- Use of Simulations;
- Joint C4I/Space;
- Joint/Combined Training and Doctrine;
- Funding for operations related to training and military engagement (OPTEMPO);
- Mobility;
- Reserves;
- Sustainment;
- Personnel; and
- Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Beyond these, the Readiness Task Force will look into any other areas suggested by the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense or Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Further, the Task Force will attempt to define readiness criteria and a system to prioritize readiness recommendations.

Final Report. The Readiness Task Force anticipates providing a final report to the Secretary of Defense by May 21, 1994. The Task Force will be divided into sub-groups to monitor the functional areas outlined above and will be prepared to make such additional recommendations concerning those areas as appropriate. The Task will also refine the recommendations made in this interim report should that prove appropriate. The proposed role of the Task Force after May 21, 1994 will be addressed in its final report.